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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
KEYBANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a national banking association, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
PAL I, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Supreme Court Docket No. 38645-2011 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court ofthe Seventh Judicial District for Madison County. 
Honorable Gregory W. Moeller, District Judge, presiding. 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq., residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho, for Appel/ant, 
PAL I, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company 
Thomas E. Dvorak, Esq., and Amber N. Dina, Esq., residing at Boise, Idaho, for Respondent, 
KeyBank National Association 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
PAL'S INTERPRETATION IS THE ONLY INTERPRETATION THAT GIVES MEANING TO IDAHO CODE 
SECTION 11-203. 
Key8ank flatly asks this Court to ignore the requirements of Idaho Code Section 11-203 
by stating, "A consistent interpretation of the Idaho Code regarding attachment, levy and/or 
sale of secured property is that a secured creditor, by nature of its vested property right, has 
no duty under Idaho Code § 11-203 to file a third party claim to preserve its secured interest ... 
. ,,1 Key8ank's request flies in the face of the plain language of Section 11-203 and the rule of 
statutory construction that requires courts to give meaning to every word of a statute. 
Idaho law is clear that courts are "required to give effect to every word, clause and 
sentence of a statute, where possible. A rule of statutory construction is that courts will not 
nullify a statute or deprive the law of force or potency unless it is absolutely necessary./I Univ. 
of Utah Hasp. and Med. Cntr. v. Bethke, 101 Idaho 245, 248 (1980) (internal citation omitted) 
(emphasis added). "That the legislature intended to ... create a meaningless provision is an 
absurd result and one which we avoid." Walker v. Nationwide Financial Corp. of Idaho, 102 
Idaho 266, 268 (1981). "It is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that statutes 
should not be construed to render other provisions meaningless." Moss v. Bjornson, 155 Idaho 
165, 166 (1988). 
1 See p. 24 of Respondent's Brief dated December 27, 2011, already on file herein. 
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The broad language of Idaho Code Section 11-203 states that "[t]he following 
procedures shall apply ... to any claim by a third party ... that he has a security interest [in 
levied property]." I.e. § 11-203 (emphasis added). The secured party "shall prepare a written 
claim setting forth the grounds upon which he claims the property, and in the case of a secured 
party, also stating the dollar amount of the claim." I.e. § 11-203(a). The secured party "shall" 
deliver its claim form "to the sheriff within fourteen (14) days" after the sheriff mailed the 
documents to the third party. "The sheriff shall refuse to accept or honor a claim not filed 
with him within that period .... " I.e. § 11-203(c) (emphasis added). After the claim of 
exemption period has elapsed, only a court order can stop the sale of the levied property. I.e. 
§ 11-203(c). 
Here, KeyBank and the district court seek to deprive Idaho Code Section 11-203 of all 
force and potency, even though this result is not "absolutely necessary." Bethke, supra. 
Neither KeyBank nor the district court offers any reasonable explanation of why it is 
"absolutely necessary" to construe the Legislature's plain language in such a way as to create 
the "absurd result" of a statute that requires persons to claim an exemption with a specific 
time period for no reason at all. Adhering to the fundamental rules of statutory construction, 
this Court must recognize that Section 11-203 means something. KeyBank's admitted failure to 
comply with Section 11-203 must mean something. This Court should reverse the district court 
and give meaning to Section 11-203. 
II 
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II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION IMPROPERLY FOCUSES ON ONE PURPOSE OF IDAHO CODE 
SECTION 11-203 TO THE EXCLUSION OF ITS OTHER EXPRESS PURPOSES. 
PAL acknowledges that one purpose of Section 11-203 is to provide due process to 
debtors. 2 But the district court's decision and KeyBank's argument do not advance this 
purpose. Instead of helping debtors, the decision assists third parties to protect their security 
interests, which is not one of the express purposes of the statute. Worse yet, the decision 
impermissibly seeks to elevate the purpose of protecting debtors to the exclusion of all others. 
As explained in Section 11-203's statement of purpose, U.S. District Judge Harold Ryan 
held Idaho's prior laws on writs of execution and garnishment to be unconstitutional. Judge 
Ryan's judgment outlined new procedures for sheriffs to follow. But the Legislature 
determined that "[t]he procedure provided in the judgment is cumbersome, expensive and 
time-consuming/or both creditors and sherif/s.,,3 Neither Judge Ryan's decision nor the 
statement of purpose indicates a concern for protecting security interests. The Legislature 
enacted Section 11-203 in response to the actual concerns for due process to the debtor and 
controlling the expense and delay to creditors and sheriffs. Section 11-203 satisfied due 
process by requiring notice to the debtor and providing a sufficient time to file a claim of 
exemption. Section 11-203 also satisfied the expense and delay concerns of creditors and 
2 Statement of Purpose, H 264 (Idaho 1991) (quoted on p. 8 of Respondent's Brief dated December 27, 2011, 
already on file herein). 
3 Statement of Purpose, H 264 (Idaho 1991) (quoted on p. 8 of Respondent's Brief dated December 27,2011, 
already on file herein) (emphasis added). 
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sheriffs by providing a simple procedure for creditors to receive an "expedited hearing" and for 
sheriffs to sell or return the levied property. 
KeyBank prOVides no authority for a court to construe a statute to achieve one purpose 
to the exclusion of other purposes, especially when the purpose it seeks to achieve (protecting 
security interests) is not one of the express purposes of the statute. Thus, the district court 
committed reversible error by focusing on a new, implied purpose for Section 11-203 
(protecting the security interest of a third party) at the expense of the express purposes of the 
statute (protecting the rights of the creditors and sheriff). 
III. 
KEYBANK'S ASSERTION OF ITS SECURITY INTEREST IN FACT IS IRRELEVANT UNDER IDAHO CODE 
SECTION 11-203 BECAUSE THAT STATUTE REQUIRES KEYBANK TO ASSERT ITS SECURITY 
INTEREST IN A SPECIFIC MANNER IN LAW. 
KeyBank seeks to excuse its undisputed failure to assert its security interest in 
accordance with Idaho Code Section 11-203 by instead arguing that it asserted its security 
interest in fact. Specifically, KeyBank wrote letters and made telephone calls to PAL's counsel 
and the sheriff asserting its security interest,4 but KeyBank did not deliver a claim of exemption 
to the sheriff within 14 days as required by Section 11-203. As explained below, assertion in 
fact is not assertion in law. 
4 R Vol. I, pp. 37,43, and 64. 
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In Nicolaus v. Bodine, 92 Idaho 639, 643 (1968), the trial court found that the county 
had closed a bridge without any intention of reopening it, abandoning the road in fact, but had 
failed to comply with the proper statutory procedure to abandon the road in law. On appeal, 
this Court agreed, stating that the county's conduct "was an abandonment in fact, but not in 
law." (Emphasis added); see also Floyd v. Board of Commissioners of Bonneville County, 137 
Idaho 718, 729 (2002) (for county to abandon road, Court required that county "strictly 
adher[e] to the procedures required by law"); Mosman v. Mathison, 90 Idaho 76, 80 (1965) 
(Court considered whether the county "did in fact and in law abandon the ... road"). The 
Court rejected the county's efforts to abandon the road in fact as insufficient, and instead 
required the county to abandon the road in law. The Court explained, "abandonment must be 
effectuated pursuant to I.e. § 40-501." 'd. at 642. Importantly, by failing to comply with the 
formal requirements to abandon the road in law under Section 40-501, the county had "denied 
respondents their right of appeal as provided in I.e. § 40-1614." 'd. at 643. 
Just like the county's failure to abandon the road by law under Section 40-501 deprived 
the respondents in Nicolaus of their right to appeal as provided in Section 40-1614, KeyBank's 
failure to assert its claim in law under Section 11-203 deprived PAL of its right to contest that 
claim by motion and expedited hearing. I.e. § 11-203(b). Section 11-203 does not provide PAL 
the right to file a motion to contest a letter or a telephone call, but does expressly provide PAL 
the right to file a motion to contest a claim of exemption filed with the sheriff, and to have that 
motion heard on an expedited basis. 'd. Moreover, while KeyBank's assertion in fact provided 
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notice to PAL and the sheriff, the letters and telephone calls provided no notice to buyers at 
the sheriff's sale who KeyBank later sued. 
Other examples serve to demonstrate the significance of asserting a claim in fact versus 
asserting a claim in law. An attorney for a personal injury claimant may write letters and make 
telephone calls to potential defendants alleging liability and seeking damages for his client, 
thereby asserting the claim in fact. But if the attorney does not assert that claim in law by 
filing an action in court within the applicable statute of limitations, then the assertion in fact is 
of no legal import. See I.e. § 5-201 (civil actions can be commenced "only" by complying with 
limitations period). 
A prevailing party in a lawsuit may demand an award of its attorney's fees and costs by 
writing letters and making telephone calls to opposing counset but if that prevailing party does 
not assert its claim in law by filing a memorandum of costs within 14 days after entry of 
judgment, then that party loses its right to the award. I.C § 5-201 (party's memorandum of 
costs "may not be" filed later than 14 days after entry of judgment). 
Similarly, an unpaid contractor may demand payment from a property owner, and 
assert the right to lien the owner's property in letters and telephone calls, but if the contractor 
does not assert that right in law by filing a claim of lien within 90 days after furnishing labor or 
services, then the contractor loses its lien rights. I.e. § 45-507(2) (claim "shall" be filed within 
90 days). 
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Moreover, a party may file post-judgment motions challenging a judgment or verdict, 
thereby putting the opposing party on notice of its disagreement with the result, but if that 
party does not file a notice of appeal with 42 days of entry of the judgment, that party cannot 
continue to challenge the result. /.A.R. 14(a) (appeal made "only" by filing notice of appeal). 
These statutes and rules have one important feature in common with Section 11-203: 
mandatory language. These laws and Section 11-203 clearly require a person to take formal 
action to assert a right in law within a prescribed time period. Compliance is mandatory. In 
these instances, assertion of the right in fact is irrelevant. The undisputed fact that KeyBank 
asserted its security interest in fact does not excuse the undisputed fact that KeyBank failed to 
assert its security interest in law under Section 11-203. 
IV. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY APPLYING IDAHO CODE SECTION 28-9-315 AS THE "NEWER" 
STATUTE OVER SECTION 11-203 AS THE "OLDER" STATUTE. 
To be perfectly clear, the Idaho Legislature enacted the current version of Section 28-9-
315 in 2001. See S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1. However, Section 28-9-315 is simply a recodification 
of I.e. § 28-9-306(2). See, e.g., Newgen v. OK Livestock Exchange, 117 Idaho 445, 447 (Ct.App. 
1990). The history of current Section 28-9-315 and the former 28-9-306(2) demonstrate that 
this law has existed in essentially the same form in all material respects since 1967. See S.L. 
1967, ch. 161. A side-by-side comparison of the original Section 28-9-306(2) and the recodified 
version in Section 28-9-315 serves to illustrate their similarities: 
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Former Idaho Code Section 28-9-306(2) Current Idaho Code Section 28-9-315 
Except where this chapter otherwise provides, (a) Except as otherwise provided in this 
a security interest continues in collateral chapter and in section 28-2-403(2): 
notwithstanding sale, exchange or other (i) A security interest or agricultural lien 
disposition thereof unless the disposition was continues in collateral notwithstanding 
authorized by the secured party in the sale, lease, license, exchange or other 
security agreement or otherwise, and also disposition thereof unless the secured 
continues in any identifiable proceeds party authorized the disposition free of the 
including collections received by the debtor. security interest or agricultural lien ... 
As demonstrated by the verbatim language of both, there is no substantive difference 
in the law originally enacted in 1967. Nonetheless, KeyBank argues that "it is not the same 
law."s This statement is disingenuous because Section 28-9-315 is in all substantive respects 
the same law. Where a legislature reenacts a prior law with only a "nonsubstantive revision," 
courts should not consider the reenacted law as the later of the two statutes. Clark v. Young, 
787 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tx.App. 1990). Section 28-9-315 simply recodifies the former Section 28-
9-306(2), which has been in place since 1967. The Legislature enacted Section 11-203 in 1991. 
Thus, this Court should apply the newer statute of Section 11-203 over the older statute of 
Section 28-9-315. 
Of course, this Court need apply the newer statute over the older statute only if the 
two statutes conflict. However, Section 28-9-315{a)(1) does not necessarily conflict with 
Section 11-203. The scope of Section 28-9-315{a)(1) is limited to a transaction that "creates" a 
security interest. I.e. § 28-9-109{a). KeyBank argues that it previously "created" a security 
interest in a transaction with the debtor, but the issue here-the effect of PAL's levy on Tri-
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Steel's property-is not a transaction that creates a security interest. Thus, there is no conflict 
because the issue in this case goes beyond the scope of Section 28-9-315 altogether. 
The district court could and should have construed the two statutes harmoniously by 
recognizing the limited scope of Section 28-9-315(a)(1) and requiring KeyBank's compliance 
with the plain language of Section 11-203. However, the district court interpreted Section 28-
9-31S(a)(1) in a way that does conflict with Section 11-203 by holding KeyBank's security 
interest continued in the levied property despite KeyBank's failure to comply with Section 11-
203. Since the district court interpreted them to conflict, the court should have followed the 
rule that "the more recently enacted statute governs/' State v. Gamino, 148 Idaho 827, 829 
(Ct.App. 2010L and required KeyBank's compliance with the more recently enacted statute, 
namely Section 11-203. 
V. 
IDAHO CODE SECTION 11-203 NEED NOT PROVIDE AN EXPRESS CONSEQUENCE FOR 
NONCOMPLIANCE IN ORDER FOR THIS COURT TO HOLD KEYBANK LOST ITS SECURITY INTEREST. 
KeyBank argues that there is no "fair warning" in Section 11-203 that a person will lose 
its security interest if it fails to file a claim,6 so the Court should not hold that KeyBank lost its 
security interest by failing to comply with Section 11-203 in this case. In other words, KeyBank 
argues that since Section 11-203 does not expressly provide a consequence for failing to 
5 See p. 16 of Respondent's Brief dated December 27,2011, already on file with the court. 
6 See, e.g., p. 14 of Respondent's Brief dated December 27,2011, already on file with the court. 
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comply, there should be no consequence for failing to comply. KeyBank's argument finds no 
support in Idaho law. 
A statute requiring a mandatory act need not expressly state the consequence for 
failing to perform that act in order for there to be a consequence. For example, Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 8(c) states, "In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth 
affirmatively ... statute of limitations ... and any other matter constituting an avoidance or 
affirmative defense." Rule 8(c) does not expressly state a consequence for a party's failure to 
plead its defense of statute of limitations. Nonetheless, this Court has repeatedly held that 
failure to plead that affirmative defense constitutes a waiver and the defendant loses the right 
to assert that defense. Cole v. State, 135 Idaho 107, 110 (2000) (quoting Anderson v. State, 133 
Idaho 788, 791 (Ct.App. 1999) (citing I.R.C.P. 8(c) and Resource Engineering, Inc. v. Siler, 94 
Idaho 935 (1972))). A defendant might argue that Rule 8(c) does not provide "fair warning" of 
the waiver since the rule does not expressly state that a defendant loses this defense if not 
pled, but this would not prevent a court from holding the defendant lost its right to assert the 
statute of limitations defense. 
Both Rule 8(c) and Section 11-203 contain mandatory language requiring persons to 
assert their rights in a specific way. Just as Rule 8(c) states that "a party shall set forth" its 
defense of statute of limitations in its responsive pleading, Section 11-203 states that a third 
party claiming a security interest in levied property "shall prepare a written claim ... stating 
the dollar amount of the claim," and the claim "shall be delivered or mailed to the sheriff 
APPElLANT'S REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL 
F:\CLlENTS\BDS\8308\Pleadings\046.Appellant's Reply Brief.doc 
Page 12 of 15 
within fourteen (14) days." I.e. § 11-203. Neither Rule 8(c) nor Section 11-203 contains an 
express consequence for failure to comply. However, just as a court properly holds that a party 
loses its right to assert the statute of limitations defense by failing to comply with the 
mandatory requirements of Rule 8(c), this Court can properly hold that Key8ank lost its right to 
assert its security interest by failing to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 11-
203. 
This result is particularly fair under Section 11-203 because Section 11-203 does provide 
fair warning by explaining that a sheriff shall refuse to accept or honor a claim not timely filed 
and shall proceed to sell the property and deliver the proceeds to the creditor. I.e. § 11-203(c). 
The result is also fair because the requirements of Section 11-203 are not burdensome, 
especially since the sheriff provided Key8ank with the claim form and instructions on how and 
when to file the claim. All Key8ank had to do was check a box, sign the form, and mail it back 
to the sheriff. For whatever reason, Key8ank either failed or refused to follow the law and the 
sheriff's instructions. 
Finally, Key8ank argues that the absence of an express consequence under Section 11-
203 "demonstrates the Idaho Legislature did not intend filing a third party claim under Idaho 
Code § 11-203 to be mandatory.,,7 However, Key8ank's argument is contrary to the plain 
language of Section 11-203 and undermined by the legal reality that courts impose 
consequences for failure to comply with mandatory law even when the statute provides no 
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express consequence. The Court should reject KeyBank's ongoing suggestion to construe 
Section 11-203 in a way that renders it meaningless. 
VI. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
PAL renews its request for an award of attorney's fees and costs. I.e. § 12-120(1); I.A.R. 
40; I.A.R. 41. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the district court's decision granting 
summary judgment to KeyBank and remand the case with instructions to enter summary 
judgment in favor of PAL. The Court should also award PAL its costs and attorney's fees 
incurred below and on appeal. 
RESPECTIVELY SUBMITTED this o?L9 day of January, 2012. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
By: 'ff-~ 
. J. Driscoll 
Attorneys for Appellant, 
PAL I, LlC 
7 See p. 16 of Respondent's Brief dated December 27,2011, already on file with the court. 
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